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Mapping Moral Motives: Approach, Avoidance, and Political Orientation
Abstract
Recent critiques of moral psychology and the contemporary culture wars highlight the
need for a better understanding of diverse moral perspectives. A model of moral motives is
proposed. The fundamental approach-avoidance distinction in motivation is crossed with self-
other focus to create four moral motives: Self-Restraint (avoidance-self), Social Order
(avoidance-other), Self-Reliance (approach-self), and Social Justice (approach-other). Three
studies explored these motives in the context of political orientation. Overall, political
conservatism was associated with avoidance motives and liberalism with approach motives.
Approach-avoidance motives were also associated with distinct patterns of results regarding
authoritarianism, social dominance, and positions on contemporary social issues. Responses of
campus political groups demonstrated the utility of the moral motives in providing a more
nuanced view of politics that also takes into account the model’s second dimension, for an
emphasis on self-focus (personality responsibility) versus other-focus (social responsibility)
further distinguished between conservative groups. Moral and political implications are
discussed.
Keywords: morality, motivation, responsibility, approach, avoidance, politics,
liberal, conservative
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Mapping Moral Motives: Approach, Avoidance, and Political Orientation
The big news story following the 2004 election was the “moral values” vote. According
to National Election Pool exit polls, a plurality (22%) of voters chose “moral values” as the most
important issue influencing their vote, and 80% of those who ranked moral issues as most
important voted for Bush; it was clearly a conservative preference (Pew Research Center, 2004).
Fueled in part by this election, much popular attention has focused on morality and its role in the
contemporary culture wars. Yet there is an unfortunate and dramatic disconnect between these
societal discussions and psychology’s treatment of the topic, for the psychological study of
morality in past decades has focused almost exclusively on moral rationality, as represented by
the work of Kohlberg (e.g., 1981, 1984); the study of moral reasoning has largely defined and
appropriated the field of moral psychology. Bemoaning this limited vision, several psychologists
have promoted a new emphasis on emotional and intuitive processes (e.g., Greene & Haidt,
2002; Haidt, 2001), and research by social psychologists has begun to broaden the boundaries of
inquiry in moral psychology (e.g., Batson, Thompson, & Chen, 2002; Haidt & Hersh, 2001;
Pizarro, Uhlmann, & Bloom, 2003; Skitka, Bauman & Sargis, 2005).
Our aim is consistent with these recent efforts to expand the purview of moral
explorations in psychology. Although a few researchers have proposed compelling themese
central to morality (Haidt & Joseph, 2004, and Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park,1997) , to
date there have not been attempts to map the moral domain from a motivational perspective. Our
interests lie in exploring the motives that underlie our morality-based beliefs, feelings, and
behaviors. To this end, we propose a model of motives that broadly informs different orientations
toward moral responsibility; such orientations, we hope to demonstrate, may help us better
understand individuals’ distinct perspectives in the moral domain.
Moral Motives 4
A Model of Moral Motives
Essentially, morality can be regarded as a set of rules that facilitate group living (e.g.,
DeWaal, 2006; Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Hauser, 2006). As De Waal (1996) notes, “Social
inclusion is absolutely central to human morality, commonly cast in terms of how we should or
should not behave in order to be valued members of society” (p. 10). Our fundamental social
interdependence (see Brewer, 2004) is evident in systems of morality, which seem to be built on
two core precepts: “benefit the group,” and its corollary, “do not over-benefit the self.” The
components of a model of morality, then, should reflect these group-based assumptions.
With this in mind, we turned to a classic distinction in psychology: approach versus
avoidance. Approaching positive outcomes versus avoiding negative outcomes is probably the
most fundamental difference in motivation theory and research. It has a long and rich history in
psychology and is represented in core conceptualizations in self-regulation; thus Carver and
colleagues (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1998; Carver & White, 1994) discuss behavioral inhibition
versus activation, and Higgins (1997, 1998) distinguishes between a prevention and promotion
focus (also see Camacho, Higgins, & Luger, 2003). Gray (1982; 1990) provides evidence for an
aversive motivational system sensitive to punishment (Behavioral Inhibition System [BIS]) and
an appetitive motivational system sensitive to reward (Behavioral Activation System [BIS]), and
research has supported a distinct neural substrate for each (see, e.g., Sutton & Davidson, 1997 on
right [BIS] versus left [BAS] prefrontal cortex activation). Further, the differential impact of
these two orientations has been demonstrated in areas as diverse as achievement (e.g., Elliot &
Church, 1997), attention (e.g., Forster, Friedman, Ozelsel, & Denzler), and interpersonal
relations (e.g, Impett, Gable, & Peplau, 2005). Most fundamentally, the approach motivational
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system is sensitive to positive outcomes and entails activation, whereas the avoidance
motivational system is sensitive to negative outcomes and entails inhibition.
When considered in terms of the moral domain, approach-avoidance regulatory strategies
parallel the two primary motives underlying parental responsibility: providing the child with the
means to survive and protecting the child from danger, thereby satisfying the child’s nurturance
and security needs (see Bowlby, 1969; Higgins, 1997). Applied to broader social bonds,
responsibilities of group members similarly lie in the domains of protecting and providing,
security and nurturance. In terms of regulating the group’s own actions, these correspond to
inhibiting (i.e., avoiding) undesirable, dangerous behaviors and activating (i.e., approaching)
behaviors that promote the group’s welfare.
With regard to moral motivation, an approach versus avoidance orientation can be
applied to the self or others; moral philosophers have discussed the importance of recognizing
both the intrapersonal and interpersonal domains of morality (see, e.g., Flanagan, 1991). Moral
regulation can be focused on one’s own behavior or the behavior of others. In our model, then,
approach-avoidance strategies are crossed with self-other focus, representing personal versus
social responsibility. Four distinct moral motives, suggesting distinct conceptions of moral
responsibility, result (see Table1): Self-Restraint (avoidance-self), Social Order (avoidance-
other), Self-Reliance (approach-self), and Social Justice (approach-other).
Self-Restraint involves a self-focused avoidance orientation focused on one’s own
negative outcomes; it can best be understood in terms of self-protection, in particular inhibition
in the face of threatening temptations. This is the realm of most of our popularized “seven
deadly sins” (e.g., lust and gluttony), for it is personal control in the face of undesirable
behaviors in order to protect the individual. From the meta-perspective of benefit to the group,
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self-restraint minimizes the depletion of group resources by individual members and more
broadly minimizes attempts to over-benefit the self.
Social Order involves the application of avoidance-based inhibition motives to other
people in order to protect the larger community. It focuses on resisting threats to the group--both
physical threats to the groups’ safety and psychological threats to the group’s identity.
Protection derives not only from following society’s rules, but also symbolically through strong
group definition (i.e., homogeneity and conformity) and adherence to a set of group-defining
social norms. Virtually all members of a community invoke Social Order to some extent, for we
typically follow restraint-based societal rules for the protection of the group and its members
(e.g., criminal law). However, the stronger the endorsement of Social Order, the greater the fear
of group breakdown and “cultural pollution” and the wider the net of social conformity. Social
Order contributes to group living by maximizing both order and group cohesion.
Self-Reliance is an approach-based orientation that involves providing for the self; the
focus is on activation for one’s own advancement and entails industriousness and independence.
At first glance Self-Reliance may not appear to be a likely candidate for a moral motive, yet it is
akin to a very familiar and highly valued moral conception in our culture, the Protestant ethic,
with its emphasis on autonomy and hard work. And although perhaps not immediately obvious,
Self-Reliance benefits the group in that it minimizes social loafing and each individual’s burden
on the group; and as individual members work to improve their lot, the group’s resources as a
whole increase as well.
Social Justice involves activation and a focus on positive outcomes; the approach-based
goal here is to help others in the community advance. Based on a desire to provide for others,
Social Justice is typically associated with efforts at insuring economic and material support for
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community members and taking care of others worse off in society. This is the domain of
egalitarianism and distributional justice. Social Justice contributes to group survival by
maximizing social welfare and strengthening social bonds.
The four moral motives represent conceptions of morality that are distinct yet
recognizable; each reflects the intersection of two dimensions—approach-avoidance and self-
other focus. All four are likely to be represented to some extent in any given individual’s moral
system, yet our unique socialization histories, temperaments, and life experiences are apt to
create a greater focus on one or more motives (Janoff-Bulman & Sheikh, 2006).
To explore the four moral motives, we turned to the realm of politics to determine
whether political orientations are associated with particular patterns, such as an emphasis on an
approach versus avoidance orientation (represented by the model’s rows) or on personal versus
social responsibility (represented by the model’s columns). Based on a major research review,
Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, and Sulloway (2003) concluded that the management of uncertainty and
threat underlies the core ideology of conservatism. It follows from their analysis that
conservatives would be high on motives associated with safety and protection—the avoidance
motives of the model (also see Lakoff, 2002, 2004). Although Jost et al. were not interested
specifically in moral psychology, the proposed model can serve to extend their work on political
ideology into the moral domain. If avoidance-based motivation is a critical element of
conservatism, we would expect conservatives to be high not only on Social Order, but on Self-
Restraint. Are liberals, in contrast, high on approach motives? In regulating morality, do
liberals and conservatives differ in self-other focus, or more specifically, their emphasis on
personal versus social responsibility?
Study 1
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The aim of this preliminary first study was to explore the associations between the four
moral motives and political orientation, specifically political liberalism versus conservatism.
Would meaningful patterns of moral motives be associated with each perspective?
Method
Participants and Procedure
Participants were 596 students (188 males, 40 females) who completed a questionnaire
packet because they were enrolled in psychology courses that constituted?? the department
subject pool. Respondents completed the questionnaires online during the first week of the
semester at a specific time and place of their own choosing. During this period an additional 17
participants declined participation in the online survey.
Materials
Moral Motives Scale. Participants completed the 20-item Moral Motives Scale (MMS;
Janoff-Bulman, Manning, & Sheikh, 2006). The MMS has four 5-item subscales corresponding
to the four moral motives (see Appendix A); items are rated on 7-point scales with endpoints 1 =
“strongly disagree” and 7 = “strongly agree.” Sample items are: “Life is full of unhealthy
attractions, so it’s important for me develop a strong sense of self-discipline and control” (Self-
Restraint); “I’m willing to put the necessary time and effort into providing for my own well-
being and success” (Self-Reliance); “Giving people the freedom to choose the way they live
threatens the societal bonds that hold us together” (Social Order); and “In the healthiest societies
those at the top feel responsible for providing better lives for those at the bottom” (Social
Justice). Reliabilities for the four subscales were .757 (Self-Restraint; M = 5.02), .746 (Social
Order; M = 2.78), .835 (Self-Reliance; M = 5.97), and .716 (Social Justice; M = 4.39). The four-
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factor structure confirmed via CFA in earlier research (Janoff-Bulman, Manning, & Sheikh,
2006) was supported here as well (see Appendix A for factor loadings).
Political Orientation. Four items tapped political orientation (see Skitka et al, 2005).
Respondents indicated where they would place themselves on two scales, one with endpoints 1 =
“Very Liberal” and 7 = “Very Conservative” and the other with endpoints 1 = “Strong
Democrat” and 7 = “Strong Republican.” Participants were also asked, “How much do you tend
to like or dislike political conservatives?” and “How much do you tend to like or dislike political
liberals?” Participants answered on 7-point scales with endpoints 1 = “dislike extremely” and 7
= “like extremely.” These four items were highly correlated and were combined (after reverse-
scoring the “dislike/like liberals” item) to provide a single measure of Political Orientation (α  =  
.79), with higher numbers indicating greater political conservatism.
Results and Discussion
Political Orientation was positively associated with Self-Restraint, r(592) = .15 , p <.001
and Social Order, r(594) = .28. p < .001, and negatively associated with Social Justice, r(586) =
-.32, p < .001. Thus the greater the conservatism, the higher the score on both avoidance motives
and the lower the score on the approach motive of Social Justice. Self-Reliance was not
associated with political orientation, but proved politically interesting when further examined.
Using a median split to divide the sample on Political Orientation, analyses indicated that Self-
Reliance was significantly positively associated with Social Justice for liberals, r(296) = .22, but
negatively associated with Social Justice for conservatives, r(243) = -.16., z-score = 4.42, p <
.001. For liberals, providing for themselves was associated with providing for others, indicating
a general approach orientation; for conservatives, the motive to provide for self was negatively
associated with the motive to provide for others, reflecting the absence of a general approach
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orientation. Overall, the rows of the model, reflecting avoidance and approach orientations,
appeared to be respectively associated with greater political conservatism and liberalism.
Study 2
Study 2 further explored the model by investigating the motives’ relationship with
individual difference measures associated with political orientation—specifically Right-Wing
Authoritarianism (RWA; Altmeyer, 1981) and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO; Pratto,
Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994; Sidanius & Pratto,1999). Duckitt, Wagner & du Plessis
(2002) proposed that two different motivations underlie RWA and SDO—desire for security and
control (based on a belief in a dangerous, threatening world) in the case of RWA, and desire for
power and dominance (based on a belief in a tough, competitive world) in the case of SDO. The
security-based motives are represented by the two avoidance motives in the model (Self-
Restraint and Social Order), and thus these should be positively associated with RWA. This
prediction is also consistent with the views of Kreindler (2005), who believes RWA represents a
concern with normative differentiation and intragroup prototypicality; these too reflect avoidance
motives, based as they are on inhibition and restraint orientations. Self-Reliance and Social
Justice, reflecting neither restraint nor safety concerns, were not expected to be associated with
RWA. Given the approach bases of these motives, a negative association with SDO seemed more
likely.
We were also interested in determining whether particular moral motives, or patterns of
moral motives, would be differentially related to attitudes on “hot-button” societal issues.
Avoidance motives (Self–Restraint and Social Order) entail sensitivity to negative outcomes and
an inhibitory orientation regarding one’s own behaviors and one’s social group (i.e., the
minimization of “deviance” at the group level); as such, they would be expected underlie
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attitudes towards societal issues specifically associated with group norms and lifestyles, such as
gay marriage and abortion. Approach motives, with their emphasis on activation and
advancement of self and others, would more likely underlie attitudes towards social issues
related to social distributions and inequities, such as affirmative action. Would approach and
avoidance motives differentially predict support for different types of moral issues? Or would
avoidance motives predict conservative positions and approach motives predict liberal positions
more generally, regardless of issue domain?
Method
Participants and Procedures
Participants were 350 undergraduate students (101 males, 249 females) enrolled in
psychology courses. They completed the questionnaires in groups of 15-30 in exchange for extra
course credit.
Materials
Participants completed the Moral Motives Scale and were asked the same four political
orientation questions described in Study 1.  These four items were again combined (α = .81) to 
create a single Political Orientation score, with higher scores indicating greater conservatism.
Participants also completed the SDO Scale (Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius & Pratto,1999) and the
RWA Scale (RWA; Altmeyer, 1981) and were asked to indicate the extent to which they
approved or disapproved (scale endpoints 1 = “approve completely” and 7 = “do not approve at
all”) of the following 10 contemporary issues: legal abortion, affirmative action in college
admissions, gay marriage, an environmental tax on luxury cars and SUV’s, stem cell research,
the death penalty, pornography on the internet, government welfare programs for the poor,
teaching creationism in the classroom, and tax cuts for the rich.
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Results and Discussion
Replicating the relationships found in Study 1, greater political conservatism was again
associated with higher scores on Self-Restraint, r (322) = .13, p < .05, Social Order, r (324) =
.30, p < .001, and lower scores on Social Justice, r (325) = -.32, p < .001. Further, Self-Reliance
was once again significantly positively correlated with Social Justice for liberals, r(159) = .21;
these were uncorrelated for conservatives, r(153) = .01, z-score = 1.78, p < .08. RWA and SDO
were highly correlated (r[304] = .44, p < .001) and were both strongly associated with Political
Orientation (r[300] = .58, p < .001, and r[310] = .39, p < .001, respectively). However, multiple
regression analyses predicting the moral motives indicated that RWA and SDO were
nevertheless differentially related to the approach and avoidance motives. As shown in Table 2,
RWA significantly predicted the two avoidance motives—Self-Restraint and Social Order—but
did not predict either of the approach motives. In contrast, SDO significantly (negatively)
predicted the two approach motives—Self-Reliance and Social Justice—but did not predict
either of the avoidance motives.
A factor analysis produced two distinct factors (see Table 3). Factor 1, which included
legal abortion and gay marriage, primarily reflected lifestyle and normative concerns. Factor 2,
which included affirmative action and welfare items, primarily reflected economic and equity
concerns. “Approval of the death penalty” and “tax cuts for the rich” were reverse-scored, and
the ratings of the respective issues were combined to create Factor 1 and Factor 2 variables, with
higher scores indicating greater disapproval (i.e., more conservative positions). Both were
strongly associated with Political Orientation, with correlations of .50 (Factor 1) and .37 (Factor
2), both p’s < .001, yet they nevertheless were differentially associated with the moral motives.
As evident in Table 3, Factor 1 was significantly predicted by the two inhibition-based avoidance
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motives—Self Restraint and Social Order (β’s = .18 and .45 respectively)—and not by either of 
the two approach motives.  Factor 2, in contrast, was significantly predicted by Social Justice (β 
= -.54), an approach motive, but not by either of the two avoidance motives.
Distinct patterns of results arose in exploring the relationship between the moral motives
and well-known individual difference measures and social issues positions. The two avoidance
motives--Self-Restraint and Social Order--were associated with RWA, but not SDO, consistent
with the proposed greater security and normative concerns underlying these moral motives. In
contrast, the two approach motives—Self-Reliance and Social Justice—were (negatively)
associated with SDO, but not RWA, consistent with the greater activation, resource-distribution
concerns of these moral motives. Further, although both social issues factors were similarly and
strongly associated with political liberalism/conservatism, they were nevertheless differentially
associated with approach versus avoidance motives, presumably reflecting the inhibition- versus
activation-based emphases of the two categories of social issues.
Study 3
As suggested by Study 2’s findings regarding social issues, the single dimension of
liberalism-conservatism no doubt simplifies the broad political spectrum of beliefs (see, e.g.,
Sidanius & Pratto, 1999 on political conservatism). Although it would be an overwhelming task
to characterize the political landscape in all its complexity, we nevertheless believed it would be
useful to begin to develop a more nuanced picture, and how it might be informed by the four
moral motives. Towards this end, we recruited members of four campus organizations; our aim
was to locate committed individuals representing both ends of the political spectrum, but with
diverse social-political agendas within both conservatism and liberalism. What aspects of the
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moral motives would be associated with these distinct representatives of liberalism and
conservatism?
Method
Participants and Procedure
Participants were 125 (71 males and 54 females) undergraduate students; 35 were
affiliated with the Campus Crusade for Christ (CCrusade), 35 with the Cannabis Reform
Coalition (CReform) , 20 with the College Republicans (CReps) and 35 were affiliated with the
University Democrats (UDems). Surveys were completed at a regular group meeting, with the
experimenter present to answer questions. The target sample (35) was met for all groups except
the CReps, which has a less active campus membership than the other organizations; despite
frequent attempts to increase participation by the leader of the group and the experimenter, the
final sample size for this group was 20. Members of each group opted to have compensation go
to the group, which was paid $5.00 per survey completed.
Materials
Participants completed the 20-item Moral Motives Scale and were also asked to indicate
their approval/disapproval of the 10 social issues presented in Study 2. Participants were asked
two questions (on 7-point scales) to tap political orientation: where they place themselves on a
liberal-conservative continuum (“Very Liberal” to “Very Conservative”) and on a scale from
“Strong Democrat” to “Strong Republican.” These two were averaged to create a new variable,
Political Orientation (α = .80), with higher scores indicating greater conservatism.  (When study 
analyses were re-run with only the liberal-conservative item, the pattern of results remained the
same.) Participants were also asked to rate the importance of religion to them (“Not at All
Important” to “Extremely Important”) and the extent of their religiosity (“Not at all Religious” to
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“Extremely Religious”).  A combined variable for Religiosity (α = .84) was created by averaging 
these two scores.
Results and Discussion
A MANOVA was conducted for the major study variables—Political Orientation,
Religiosity, and the moral motives—with campus group and gender as independent variables. A
strong main effect for group was found, F (24) = 12.25, p < .001; there was no gender main
effect or interaction. The campus groups significantly differed on Political Orientation (for F’s
and means, see Table 4.) The CReps and the CCrusade were more conservative than the
UDems and CReform (and scored above the midpoint [4] of the scale), but differed from each
other, with the CReps scoring highest on conservatism; the UDems and CReform did not differ
(and scored below the midpoint). CCrusade had the highest scores on Religiosity and differed
from the other groups; the two liberal groups had the lowest scores and did not differ from each
other.
There was a significant main effect for campus group for all four moral motives (see
Table 4 for F’s and means). The two conservative groups (CCrusade and CReps) had the highest
scores on the two avoidance motives--Self-Restraint and Social Order--and did not differ from
one another. The two liberal groups (UDems and CReform) had significantly lower Social Order
scores than both conservative groups and lower Self-Restraint scores than the CReps. The
CReps had significantly lower scores on Social Justice and higher scores on Self-Reliance than
the other three groups. Once again, the pattern of associations between Self-Reliance and Social
Justice differed for the conservative and liberal groups: positively correlated for the liberal
groups considered together, r(70) = .18, and negatively correlated for the conservative groups,
r(55) = -.25, z-score = 2.37, p < .02.
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As in Study 2, the social issues were subjected to a factor analysis, which yielded the
same two strong, independent factors, with loadings ranging from .656 to .866. Death penalty
and tax cuts for the rich were reverse-scored and the five variables loading on each factor were
again combined to create Factor 1 and Factor 2, with higher scores again indicating greater
conservatism (i.e., disapproval). As shown in Table 4, the four campus groups differed
significantly on both factors. On Factor 1 (e.g., abortion, gay marriage), the UDems and
CReform had the most liberal views and differed from the other two groups; the CCrusade
reported the greatest disapproval (see Table 4). With regard to Factor 2 (e.g., affirmative action,
welfare), the CReps indicated the greatest disapproval and differed from the three other groups. .
Overall, the two liberal groups (UDems and CReform) were virtually identical across all
measures, but this was not the case for the conservative groups. The CCrusade and CReps had
similarly high scores on the avoidance motives, and in fact when a combined Avoidance score
(Self-Restraint + Social Order) was calculated, the conservatives groups did not differ from each
other and had significantly higher scores than the two liberal groups, F(3,121) = 16.06, p < .001).
Yet the conservative groups clearly differed on Self-Reliance and Social Justice (and the social
issues factors). In order to further explore these differences, we looked more closely at the
columns of the model: self-other focus. Combining the two motives in each column, Self Focus
(Self-Restraint + Self-Reliance) and Other Focus (Social Order + Social Justice) variables were
created. As shown in Figure 1, the CReps had significantly higher Self Focus scores than the
other three groups, F(3,120) = 6.11, p < .001 (means: 6.37 [CReps] versus 5.45 [CReform], 5.71
[ Crusade], and 5.67 [UDems]). In contrast (see Figure 2), the CCrusade had significantly higher
scores on Other Focus than the other three groups, F(3, 121) = 14.69, p < .001; means: 4.33
[CCrusade] versus 3.52 [CReform], 3.43 [ CReps], and 3.74 [UDems]).
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The two liberal groups were both low on the avoidance motives. Compared to the
conservative groups, they seemed to exhibit a general approach orientation; their Self-Reliance
scores were positively associated with Social Justice. In contrast, the conservative groups were
again characterized by high scores on the avoidance motives, Self-Restraint and Social Order.
They differed, however, on the approach motives. Findings regarding Self and Other Focus
provided clues to these differences. It appears that the CReps are high on moral motives
involving the regulation of their own behavior (self-focus), rather the regulation of others’
behaviors or outcomes; this might be deemed closest to a “libertarian” perspective. In contrast,
the CCrusade focused primarily on others, both in terms of inhibition-based (Social Order) and
activation-based motivations (Social Justice), reflecting what might be labeled a
“communitarian” perspective. These two perspectives seem to reflect different combinations of
fiscal versus social liberalism and conservatism. Thus, libertarianism seems most consistent with
fiscal conservatism and social liberalism, whereas communitarianism seems most consistent with
fiscal liberalism and social conservatism. Overall, then, the moral motives can help inform
political orientations, with the rows of the moral motives model reflecting broad differences in
political conservatism versus liberalism, and the columns reflecting differences in libertarian
versus communitarian perspectives (see Figure 3).
General Discussion
The four cells of the proposed model of moral motives are each defined by two
dimensions: approach-avoidance and self-other focus. The approach-avoidance dimension,
reflecting differences in activation-inhibition, appears to broadly distinguish between political
liberalism and conservatism. In these studies the inhibition-based avoidance motives (Self-
Restraint, Social Order) were associated with RWA, norm-based social issues, and more
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generally, political conservatism. Across all studies, conservatives were highest on the two
avoidance motives. The activation-based approach motives (Self-Reliance, Social Justice) were
associated (negatively) with SDO and more generally with political liberalism; liberals were high
on Social Justice, and Social Justice predicted scores on the equity-based social issues.
Also, across all three studies the Self-Reliance scores of liberals were positively
associated with Social Justice, whereas for conservatives, Self-Reliance scores were negatively
(Studies 1 and 3) correlated or uncorrelated (Study 2) with Social Justice. For liberals, the
consistent positive association with Social Justice suggests a broad approach-based morality,
reflected in the assumption that we have a responsibility to provide for both ourselves and others
in society. Self-Reliance in the absence of Social Justice, the conservative view, seems to reflect
a belief in our responsibility to provide for ourselves alone. For liberals, benefiting the self also
benefits the group (the core precept of morality) through direct sharing of personal resources; for
conservatives the benefit to the group is more indirect, involving the inhibition of social loafing
and an increase in overall group resources. The conservative view is consistent with a strong
emphasis on individualism, so often promoted in American culture; liberals’ positive
associations between Self-Reliance and Social Justice reflect stronger beliefs in societal
interdependence.
The nature of the path from basic approach-avoidance motivations to higher-level
attitudes remains open to speculation. Temperament and experience no doubt produce greater
activation or inhibition tendencies that are reflected in different behavioral and emotional
sensitivities. Future research will hopefully help us understand how these sensitivities, over
time, generate differential preferences in complex values and judgments, such that basic
approach-avoidance tendencies underlie politically liberal versus conservative orientations.
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Results of Study 3 suggest the importance of the model’s second dimension--self-other
focus--for further understanding political orientation, and political conservatism in particular.
Although the liberal groups could not be characterized in terms of particular endorsement of
either Self or Other Focus, College Republicans were especially high on Self Focus, represented
by Self-Restraint and Self-Reliance, and Campus Crusade for Christ were especially high on
Other Focus, represented by Social Order and Social Justice. These differences supplemented
high scores on the avoidance motives for both conservative groups.
From a practical perspective these findings raise possibilities for shifting political
coalitions and connections across the liberal-conservative spectrum. For example, if members of
the Religious Right emphasize Social Justice over Social Order concerns (e.g., embrace poverty
rather than abortion or gay marriage as a pivotal political issue) alliances with political liberals,
with their approach-based emphasis on Social Justice, become increasingly feasible.
In contemporary America, whether we are talking about liberals versus conservatives,
Democrats versus Republicans, or red states versus blue states, these groups seem to view the
world differently. Each side no doubt regards its own political views and societal perspectives as
morally right and eminently justifiable (e.g., Kruger & Gilovich, 2004; Ross & Ward, 1996) and
the other side’s views as morally suspect and ill-intentioned (e.g., Ehrlinger, Gilovich, & Ross,
2005; Reeder, Pryor, & Wohl, 2005). Yet we all operate from our own models of reality,
including our conceptions of morality, and our positions become comprehensible when viewed
in light of these respective models. The model of moral motives explored in these studies is an
attempt to begin to understand the motivations underlying these different conceptions. In
applying the model to politics, our intent was not to claim that conservatives or liberals are more
or less moral, but rather that they both operate from a meaningful understanding of
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responsibility, even if these often dramatically differ from one another. By trying to comprehend
and appreciate others’ moral motives, we may not always approach greater agreement, but we
are nevertheless likely to approach the worthy goal of a more civil society.
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Table 1: Model of Moral Motives
Self Focus Other Focus
(personal responsibility) (social responsibility)
Approach SELF-RESTRAINT SOCIAL ORDER
(activation)
Avoidance SELF-RELIANCE SOCIAL JUSTICE
(inhibition)
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Table 2 : Predicting the Moral Motives from SDO and RWA
SDO RWA
Avoidance Motives (betas)
Self-Restraint -.074 .200*
Social Order .054 .618**
Approach Motives (betas)
Self-Reliance -.172* -.065
Social Justice -.355** -.102
* p < .01 ** p < .001
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Table 3: Contemporary Social Issues: Factors and Regression Analyses
Avoidance Motives (β’s)        Approach Motives (β’s)
Self-Restraint Social Order Self-Reliance Social Justice
Factor loadings
Factor 1 .18* .45** -.01 -.01
legal abortion .753
stem cell research .740
gay marriage .598
pornography .600
creationism .433
Factor 2 .02 .11 .13 -.54**
affirmative action .556
environmental tax .420
death penaltyr .577
welfare programs .707
tax cuts for the richr .441
r reverse-scored; higher scores indicate greater conservatism
* p < .01
** p < .001
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Table 4: Group Means for Study 3 Variables
Campus Groups F values
Campus Cannabis College University
Crusade Reform Republicans Democrats
For Christ Coalition
Political Orientation 4.50a 2.39b 5.93c 2.32b 76.14**
Religiosity 6.22a 2.76b 4.40c 2.69b 40.76**
Moral Motives
Self-Restraint 5.47a,b 5.00a 5.96b 5.11a 4.33*
Self-Reliance 5.95a 5.89a 6.73b 6.23a 6.02**
Social Order 3.25a 1.79c 3.12a 2.35b 12.94**
Social Justice 5.41a 5.24a 3.74b 5.13a 12.94**
Factor 1 Issues1 5.48a 1.96c 4.25b 2.13c 70.23**
Factor 2 Issues1 3.97a 2.67a 5.02b 3.19a 23.24**
1 higher scores indicate a more conservative responses
* p < .01
** p < .001
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Figure Captions
Figure 1: Personal Responsibility Scores for Campus Groups
Figure 2: Social Responsibility Scores for Campus Groups
Figure 3: Moral Motives and Political Orientations
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Other Focus
(Social Order + Social Justice)
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Self Focus Other Focus
(personal responsibility) (social responsibility)
Approach CONSERVATIVE
(activation)
LIBERTARIAN COMMUNITARIAN
Avoidance LIBERAL
(inhibition)
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Appendix A
Moral Motives Scale
We are interested in the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statements below. Using
the following scale, please indicate the extent of your agreement by placing the number that best
represents your response on the line preceding each statement. There are no correct or incorrect
reactions, so please be as honest as possible in responding. Thanks.
strongly strongly
disagree agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
.
____ 1. It’s particularly important to me to demonstrate self-control in the face of temptation.
____ 2. We should all be responsible for improving the welfare of others beyond our immediate
circle of friends and family
____ 3. Giving people the freedom to choose the way they live threatens the societal
bonds that hold us together.
____ 4. I’m willing to put the necessary time and effort into providing for my own well-being
and success.
____ 5. It’s an obligation, not a matter of personal preference, to provide for people worse off
even if we’re not close to them.
____ 6. I value hard work and personal commitment when it comes to making decisions in my
life.
____ 7. People should not be completely free to express themselves through their own choice of
lifestyle, even if they don’t harm others.
____ 8. When things get tough, I apply myself and work even harder to overcome difficulties.
____ 9. Self-discipline in the lifestyle I choose is an important way for me to feel like a decent
person.
____10. It’s important for those who are better off in society to work hard to provide more
resources for those who are worse off.
____ 11. By bucking tradition and choosing new lifestyles, people are actually threatening the
wider society.
____ 12. I demonstrate I’m a better person every time I exercise self-restraint rather than give in
to my desires.
____ 13. I think it’s important to take responsibility for my failures and setbacks rather than
blame other people.
____ 14. It’s not always easy to avoid temptations, but for my own good I feel I really have to
try my best.
____ 15. If we look after ourselves, we still need to look after others in society.
____ 16. Whether or not I have others to lean on, I think it’s important for me to try to provide
for myself.
____ 17. When we try to get people to abide by our own code of behavior, we are not invading
other people’s privacy and right to choose for themselves.
____ 18. In the healthiest societies those at the top feel responsible for providing better lives for
those at the bottom.
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____ 19. Life is full of unhealthy attractions, so it’s important for me develop a strong sense of
self-discipline and control.
____ 20. In a decent society, people should not be free to make their own choices about how to
live their lives, but should attend to community standards
Subscales (with respective factor loadings):
Self-Restraint: items 1, 9, 12, 14, 19
(.669, .580, .79, .770, .758)
Social Order: items 3, 7, 11, 17, 20
(.647, .682, .697, .615, .656)
Self-Reliance: items 4, 6, 8, 13, 16
(.798, .794, .767, 530, .572)
Social Justice: items 2, 5, 10, 15, 18
(.760, .752, .767, .769, .688)
